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ABSTRACT
Objectives: To provide an overview of the complicity of
British American Tobacco (BAT) in the illicit trade of
cigarettes across the African continent in terms of
rationale, supply routes and scale.
Methods: Analysis of internal BAT documents and
industry publications.
Results: BAT has relied on illegal channels to supply
markets across Africa since the 1980s. Available
documents suggest smuggling has been an important
component of BAT’s market entry strategy in order to gain
leverage in negotiating with governments for tax
concessions, compete with other transnational tobacco
companies, circumvent local import restrictions and
unstable political and economic conditions and gain a
market presence. BAT worked through distributors and
local agents to exploit weak government capacity to gain
substantial market share in major countries.
Conclusions: Documents demonstrate that the compli-
city of BAT in cigarette smuggling extends to Africa,
which includes many of the poorest countries in the
world. This is in direct conflict with offers by the company
to contribute to stronger international cooperation to
tackle the illicit tobacco trade.
It has been estimated that 10.7% of global cigarette
sales were attributed to illicit trade in 2006.1 The
illicit tobacco trade, primarily smuggling and
counterfeiting, significantly harms public health
‘‘by making cigarettes cheaper, more accessible and
more difficult to regulate’’.2 Article 15 of the World
Health Organization’s Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC) makes broad provision
for measures to combat the illicit trade in tobacco
products.3 In 2006, the Conference of the Parties to
the FCTC agreed to convene an expert group to
‘‘prepare a template for a protocol on illicit trade.’’4
In February 2008, negotiations commenced aimed
at developing such a protocol by 2010.5
Contraband is a key component of illicit trade,
and previous analyses have detailed the complicity
of transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) in
cigarette smuggling in Europe,6–8 Asia,8–11 North
America8 and Latin America,8 including the TTCs’
modus operandi in the illicit tobacco trade.6 To
date, there has been no scholarly analysis of such
activity in Africa, although important revelations
were put forth about British American Tobacco
(BAT) and smuggling in Africa by the Campaign
for Tobacco-Free Kids,8 UK Action on Smoking and
Health12 and investigative journalists in 2000–113
including evidence heard by the UK House of
Commons Health Select Committee.14 Since these
reports, which were based on a small number of
documents available at that time, the capacity to
systematically search BAT’s publicly accessible
corporate documents produced in response to
smoking and health litigation has improved
because of enhanced online access and improved
searching capabilities available at the British
American Tobacco Document Archive (BATDA)
developed in 2004.15
Understanding cigarette smuggling in Africa is
important for two reasons. First, smuggling is
substantial and, according to BAT’s estimates, is
growing,16 thus undermining public health efforts
to address the upward trajectory of tobacco use on
the continent.17 Documents suggest smuggling has
occurred in at least 40 of 54 African countries,
including countries with the largest populations.
Second, African countries have been particularly
vulnerable to the loss of customs revenues as a
consequence of cigarette smuggling. According to
the Commission for Africa, customs revenues
provide up to one-quarter of government revenue.18
Therefore, smuggling weakens the already limited
capacity of many African governments to achieve
broader economic development goals.
This paper focuses on BAT, which historically
has had a large market presence in Africa; at times,
having a market share of over 90% in 11 sub-
Saharan African countries and an overall market
share of about 15% across the continent.19 20 The
company publicly asserts, ‘‘British American
Tobacco companies do not smuggle. We do not
condone smuggling, and we do not encourage or
collude with others to smuggle on our behalf’’.21
Internal documents, however, suggest that contra-
band had been central to BAT’s corporate strategy
across Africa. While distributors and local agents
ran day-to-day operations, documents describe
how BAT knowingly supplied cigarettes to such
parties for contraband purposes while simulta-
neously relying on legal exports as cover for larger-
scale smuggling. A more comprehensive under-
standing of TTCs and cigarette smuggling in Africa
supports the need for strengthening collective
measures across countries to effectively address
the problem.
METHODS
This paper is based on internal documents from
the Guildford Depository and BATDA. The obsta-
cles to accessing, and the limitations of working
with, BAT documents have been previously
described.22–25 This paper is based on an iterative
search strategy, commencing with an on-site
search at the Guildford Depository during 1999–
2001 at the file level using the depository’s
crude index to search keywords based on
African geographical names, staff and recognised
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euphemisms for smuggling such as ‘‘transit’’, ‘‘duty not paid’’
and ‘‘general trade’’ (GT).8 10 26 27 Two key files were identified
from this initial research (FJ3201 and BB0123), which led to
initial revelations in 2000–1.9 12 13 28 29 Since 2004, improvements
in document access at BATDA, which houses electronic copies
of the documents located at the Guildford Depository, has
enabled systematic full-text searching at the keyword level.30 31
Keyword searches of the online collection were carried out
between 2004 and 2007 using individual names, brands and
associated parties. Advanced Boolean searches were undertaken
using combined keywords. Document analysis incorporated
several validation techniques within a hermeneutic process,32
including corroboration of interpretation among authors and
attempted triangulation of findings via trade publications,
newspaper articles and academic journals.
RESULTS
Business rationale for smuggling cigarettes in Africa
‘‘Alternative routes…to keep the franchise alive, meet targets and
fend off competition.’’33
Documents suggest that the contraband trade accomplished
several goals for TTCs in Africa. First, cigarette smuggling
allowed TTCs to gain leverage in negotiations, similar to that
used with governments for improved market access and foreign
investment similar to efforts in Vietnam,34 the former Soviet
Union7 and China.11 In Africa, contraband helped tobacco
companies argue for altered (invariably, reduced) taxation. For
example, a document concerning Nigeria states:
PMI [Philip Morris International] wish[es] to propose an industry
presentation to the Nigerian Government for a specific import
duty to replace ad valorem rate. The objective would be to
legalise ‘profitable’ imports thus providing the Nigerian
Government with revenue currently lost by the proliferation of
GT [General Trade].35
Similarly, minimising taxation was described as a motive to
engage in contraband tobacco trade by BAT in Nigeria.36
Second, cigarette smuggling has been a response to intense
regional competition among TTCs for establishing and growing
market share. BAT, for example, observed the growing contra-
band trade, and perceived the need to do the same to remain
competitive.37 After visiting the Ghanaian subsidiary Pioneer
Tobacco Company, Russell Cameron, of BAT UK & Export
(BATUKE) commented, ‘‘[We] will continue to be cautious in
our SEFK [State Express Filter King] business in Togo … .
However, our competition were [sic] outsupplying us by 250%
in transit terms’’.38 Another 1987 document stated that ‘‘The
price differential [between SEFK and competitor’s brands]
highlights the potential for increased SEFK transit across the
Togo/Ghana border. Further routes of entry need to be
investigated to realise this potential’’.39
Third, contraband has acted to circumvent barriers to market
access posed by government restrictions or local conditions. In
the late 1990s, BAT recognised that trade barriers were
substantial in Africa and noted that ‘‘instability will continue
to characterise the African political scene’’.40 In Angola, for
example, BAT considered disposing of its 50% ownership of
Empresa dos Tabacos de Angola (ETA) in 1993 because of the
civil war:
Resurgence of the civil war since October 1992 has had its toll on
the economy of an already battered country … pushing most
businesses towards the use of the parallel and the black market,
which is ‘‘illegal’’. In not using the black market ETA is at a
significant disadvantage to other companies.41
In some countries, where cigarette imports were not
permitted, contraband was seen as the only supply route:
Zaire … is changing into a GT [General Trade] market and there
is no reliable information regarding the current levels of imported
brands and the shares … Imports into Malawi, and Uganda are
specifically banned and the only route in will be by GT.42
In other cases, smuggling was supported even where legal
imports were permitted. In a 1991 memo, BAT marketing
executive, Joe Green considered the distribution strategies for
Cameroon in terms of two scenarios where (1) legal imports
were permitted and (2) legal imports were prohibited. Even if
legal imports were allowed, Green stated, ‘‘GT shipments will
remain the mainstay of our activity ... . The Malabo distribution
channel will have to be maintained … . Maintain a minimum
cover level of BHSF [Benson and Hedges brand] via legal
imports’’.43
The scale of the contraband market in Africa
Although comprehensive data of smuggled product by volume
or value remain elusive owing to the illegal nature of the trade,
BAT’s sales figures for certain years estimate that contraband
represents a high proportion of the total market in some African
countries. In West Africa, the flow and amount of contraband
across countries is described for 1987 in figure 1. Sales of Lucky
Strike by country for 1993 (table 1) suggest that contraband
(general trade) comprised 45% of market in Nigeria, 14% in
Zaire and 12% in Ghana. All three countries were described as
prohibiting legal imports.44 For 1987, BATUKE estimated the
percentage of the total market from transit, and its own
percentage contribution to each market (table 2). The total
transit market in Nigeria was estimated to be 4%, while
BATUKE’s contribution was around 55%. In Cameroon and
Burkino Faso, the transit market was 0.5% and 0.55%, with
BATUKE’s contribution around 68% and 60% respectively.45 In
terms of estimated value, documents describe BATUKE’s transit
business in Niger was worth about £14 million in 198946 and £10
million in Nigeria in 1990.47
The role of distributors and transiteers in Africa
Keeping BAT ‘‘at arm’s length from transit customers’’
Documents describe how BAT worked through distributors
that, acting as middlemen, purchased cigarettes from BATUKE
and then supplied them to ‘‘transiteers’’48—a term used to refer
to those parties that physically transport contraband across
borders.49 50 A key distributor for BAT in Africa from 1977 to the
late 1980s was the Liechtenstein-based company Sorepex, which
BAT characterised as being a ‘‘gravy train’’ for the company.51
Sorepex was later succeeded by Gerconal Holdings,14 a wholesale
distribution company used by BAT until at least 1999.52
A key function of distributors was to insulate BAT from
direct contact with transiteers, thus reducing the risk of
detection and prosecution. Soropex, for example, ‘‘provide[d]
‘cover’, albeit increasingly flimsy, for BAT in some fairly shady
business’’.51 In Cameroon,
It was agreed that Michel Chevaly [of Sorepex] was in an
exposed position and in [the] future JMT [John Ticehurst,
BATUKE] should not travel with him in Cameroon. One of the
main functions of SOREPEX was to allow BAT to keep at arm’s
length from transit customers—particularly in Cameroon.48
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Developing and managing border crossings
Documents show that distributors offered BAT detailed knowl-
edge of major entry points to the African continent, including
Port Said, Egypt, for North Africa, Djibouti for East Africa and
Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, for West Africa.53 Entry points
appear to have been selected on the basis of historically
successful passage for contraband and an onward network of
supply.54
Once contraband reached the continent, distributors’ knowl-
edge of specific border crossings for onward supply to individual
countries was critical. In 1987, Sorepex reported:
In August there will be a shipment by sea. If this shipment goes
smoothly then future shipments will be by sea for cost saving
purposes….
Zone II—others
… a particular customer … has opened two new routes to Sudan:
i. From Chad: N’Jamena to Abeche and Adre (Sudan border)
ii. From RCA: Bangui to Biaro (Sudan border). It is anticipated
that 800 cases of BHSF [Benson and Hedges brand] will go via
these routes in July.55
Plans to conceal cigarettes among other merchandise and
falsify documents on the origin of the stock were made known
to BAT:
Sales departing from Malabo to North Cameroun and Chad. Via
three transporters: Sodisa, Mouchili and Bogno …
(1) For the first time, Bogno will buy 300 cartons: this is the
capacity of his truck, taking into account the other merchandise
which will ‘hide’ the cigarettes
(2) Each time, I will ask M & B [Mouchili and Bogno] to sign a
document testifying that the cigarettes have really been exported
from the North. I will countersign this document which will
enable BAT to pay them—via Sorepex …[translated from original
French]56
Similarly, the supply routes for State Express Filter King
cigarettes to Sierra Leone were described in 1985 as follows:
In the three weeks, Bah [smuggler] had sold 300 of the 420 cases.
Next SEFK will be sent (via) Conakry, instead of via Dakar
(where two borders had to be crossed). Transit Conakry/
Freetown would be by lorry … (estimate 1/2 containers monthly,
ie 600 cases SEFK for Sierra Leone). Later they want BHSF, which
would be stuffed in same container, but documents/cases, would
have to be marked ‘in transit’.57
Similarly, to avoid detection between Niger and Nigeria, Sorepex
reported that ‘‘[D]irect imports to Nigeria [would be] through Mr
Adji…[who] would disguise the cigarette importations by calling
Figure 1 Flow and volume of BATUKE cigarettes via the contraband trade in West Africa (1987). Reproduced from the original document in the British
American Tobacco Document Archive (Fenn44).
Table 1 Lucky Strike sales by selected African country (1993)*
Country Local Imports General trade Total market
Cameroon 2955.0 0 246.0 3241.0
Ghana 1670.0 0 232.5 1902.5
Kenva 6072.5 14.9 0.0 6087.4
Malawi 1061.7 0.2 0 1061.9
Mauritius 1254.7 1.4 0 1247.1
Nigeria 6600.0 0 5400.0 12 000.0
Sierra Leone 472.1 400.2 0 872.3
South Africa 31 339.8 0 0 31 339.8
Uganda 1385.6 0 139.5 1525.1
Zaire 2200.0 0 357.0 2557.0
Zimbabwe 2128.0 0 0 2128
*Reproduced from the original document in the British American Tobacco Document
Archive.42
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the shipment something else, e.g. matches …’’.58 In Zaire and
Sudan, distributors informed BAT of dangerous local conditions at
border crossings:
Point 38 is an area of land on the Zaire/Sudan border near
Uganda, it is somewhat of a no-man’s land and is a major centre
for barter. Because of the dangers in the area and the customs
situation in Kenya the lorries in convoys of 30–50 trucks are
escorted through Kenya and Uganda by the army....Dr Kaboash
would like to supply Benson & Hedges through this route and
feels that 500 cases every 2 months would suffice with shipment
by sea to Mombasa [sic] and that this business should start in
April. This appeared to be an interesting opportunity which we
should follow up.59
Another consideration in identifying border crossings was the
volume of potential trade to be achieved. In Sudan, Sorepex
reported that an additional smuggling route might not only
appease transiteers, but also would ensure larger distribution:
Re. Sodisa: I asked Daher to create a second sales circuit, parallel
to his customary route, and to negotiate directly with the
Sudanese who sell their gum Arabic [adhesive for cigarette
papers] in Bangui (bypassing Ousta as intermediary). This will
enable him to crack the monopoly of the Birao [city in Central
African Republic] dealers, whilst keeping them on his side (by
paying them commission and selling them small quantities of
cigarettes) because these people are indispensable in negotiating
border crossings; Daher will use this new circuit to sell 300
cartons which we will send him at the end of March. [Translated
from original French]60
For many countries, flexibility in the mode of transport (road,
rail, sea and air) was another important consideration. In
Guinea, military aircraft were used for air transport during the
wet season.61 While the choice of transport was influenced by
time and cost, the deciding factor seemed to be likelihood of
detection:
CIGARETTES BY AIR Cigarettes are arriving at Conakry Airport
on a fairly regular basis. Air transport is obviously more
expensive than traditional methods but it is quicker and customs
at Conakry airport are certainly less strict and organised than at
port.62
Where one mode of transport became unavailable, the
distributor investigated alternatives:
The Djibouti Government has again closed the port for dhow
[Arab sailing vessel] trade thereby preventing re-exports to
Somalia by this route. As on the previous occasion, our
distributor in Djibouti is investigating methods of supplying
Somalia by overland route.63
‘‘Taking more control of the business’’: BAT pursues stronger local
presence
The illegal nature of the business, and often unstable market
conditions, at times, led to tensions among BAT, Soropex and
local agents, which may have played a part in BAT’s efforts to
have more control over its transit business. For example, in
Djibouti, the failure of prepaid contraband to arrive raised the
question of which party should incur the loss, with transiteers
apparently threatening to cease moving BAT contraband.65 66 In
Guinea, BAT became concerned that transiteers were also
smuggling competitors’ brands:
One of Bobo’s key distributors, Hadi, the agent in Labe´, has just
agreed to act as a transiteer for Marlboro. This is obviously in
direct conflict with his role in Bobo’s organisation and in the
view of the BAT representative is totally unacceptable.62
These concerns followed earlier suspicions that a BAT
employee based in Guinea was also smuggling Marlboro
cigarettes:
Enlarging previous info, RG [BAT executive Rob Galgut] said
that PR [B&W executive Paul Richardson] had been known to
boast that he made more selling containers of [sic] Marlboro than
he got from BAT/B&W… PR worked for BATUKE at one time,
was well connected with transiteers, particularly in Conakry.66
BAT may have also sought more control of the business
owing to a perceived loss of income from transit sales because of
unstable market conditions in Africa. In 1987, BATUKE sought
to reduce reliance on Sorepex, as a cost-saving measure, but also
because of the distributor’s failure to execute plans as
expected.46 As described by BAT staff, ‘‘[w]e are continually
Table 2 Total market by proportion from transit and transit market by proportion from BATUKE for selected
African countries (1987)*
Country
Total
market Local Imports Transit
BATUKE
% Total
market % Imports % Transit.
Nigeria 11.5 7.5 – 4.0 19.1 – 55
Sierra Leone 1.5 1.0 – 0.5 4 – 12
Ghana 2.0 1.75 – 0.25 2 – 14
Cameroon 3.5 3.0 – 0.5 10 – 68
Liberia 0.5 0.25 0.1 0.15 8 42 –
Guinea-Conakry 1.6 – 1.6 40 40 –
Senegal 2.0 1.4 (0.5) 0.6 10.1 26 –
Cote d’Ivoire 3.8 3.4 (1.5) 0.2 0.2 3.1 50 5
Mali 2.0 0.8 0.8 0.4 – – –
Burkina Faso 1.2 0.45 0.55 0.2 23 51 60
Benin 0.6 – 0.6 5 5 –
Togo 0.6 – 0.6 3 3 –
Gambia 0.3 – 0.3 1 1 –
Mauritania 0.4 – 0.15 0.25 4 9 –
Total 31.5 19.55 (2.0) 5.5 6.45
*Reproduced from the original document from the British American Tobacco Document Archive (Fenn45)
BATUKE, British American Tobacco UK & Export.
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improving our knowledge of the transit end markets and taking
more control of the business. Steps are being taken to diminish
our reliance on Sorepex’’.64
In West Africa, BAT established its own staff on the ground
to effectively bypass the distributor. At the same time, it was
important for the company that Sorepex remained to be seen as
in command within ‘‘sensitive markets’’. For example, in
business agreements intended to govern the relationship
between BAT and Sorepex into the 1990s, it was reported that:
BAT has ‘‘staffed up’’ in West Africa to the point where there is
duplication of efforts between SOREPEX and BAT (UK&E). Our
objective now is to preserve the ‘‘fac¸ade’’ that SOREPEX
represents between us and the sensitive markets of Togo, Benin,
Niger (Unit I) and Equatorial Africa (Unit II), but at the same
time, enable the BAT field force to take over the management of
this important business.67
A 1988 BATUKE document suggests that the company
subsequently incorporated the role of the distributor, in
developing and maintaining supply routes for contraband, into
the role of the company’s own ‘‘Red Sea/Central’’ area manager:
Transit—as a result of the hard currency shortages and internal
chaos and corruption in most markets there is a growing demand
for transit. The Job Holder is required to evaluate routes, prices
and risks, then to recommend action to the Area Manager. He is
also required to exercise judgement over sales/shipments when
markets are supplied by more than one source. Constant
vigilance is necessary in pricing because of the competitiveness of
the area and the problem of parallel shipments between various
territories within the Middle East and West Africa.68
BAT staff, such as Paul Richardson (BritCo, BAT subsidiary in
Niger), also appeared to take a more active role tracking the
movement of contraband:
I would however like to take the opportunity [afforded by a trip
to Abidjan, Ivory Coast] to visit Sierra Leone en route primarily
to assess the volume of 555 transit and to a lesser extent that of
Lucky Strike. I would also be interested in finding out if any of
the Gladstone brought through Conakry port ‘‘in transit for
Sierra Leone’’ is actually being consumed there.69
Using legal sales ‘‘to provide cover for advertising and GT
business’’
In 1986, BATUKE recognised that legal sales of certain brands
remained low in volume in West Africa.70 However, documents
also suggest that low volume trade served two essential business
purposes: (1) to enable BAT to advertise its brands in key
markets and (2) to facilitate much larger sales via the contra-
band trade. As described in a 1991 memorandum on Cameroon
to senior BAT executives:
When the issue…was discussed where BATUKE wish to appoint
a domestic importer enabling us to provide cover for advertising
and GT business, Sir Patrick [Sheehy, BAT Industries Chairman]
felt that it was perfectly acceptable for BAT Cameroon to
recommend a domestic importer for BHS [Benson & Hedges
Specials].71
Another 1991 memo, regarding the launch of a new brand in
West Africa, suggests similar intentions to use newly introduced
legal cigarettes as cover for contraband sales:
The reasons why we were so enthusiastic about Lambert &
Butler were: ... the possibility of GT exploitation were considered
to be good (Ghana, Cameroon) ... this is highly political and the
best interests of the who[le] BAT group may not be the deciding
factor … I accept that in retrospect we may have been over
optimistic about its [L&B] potential in Togo, Benin, Niger, but
the main reason for its launch in those markets was not to
exploit domestic markets but for GT opportunities.72
Using small legal sales as cover seems to have been standard
practice for BAT in Africa. In Zaire the company evaluated
various options for undertaking this process:
There are two questions key to Sorepex’s future business in
Zaire.
(a) Can Sorepex with BAT Z’s [BAT’s subsidiary in Zaire]
permission appoint another official importer who will pay taxes
to act as cover for transit business? ...
(b) If it is not feasible, would BAT Z consider selling official
imports to Sorepex client directly and so enabling cover?73
In Sierra Leone, it was recognised that the instigation of legal
cover could help ‘‘fend off the competition’’.74 In Nigeria, where
legal imports commenced in 1990, a handwritten memo
describes the desire to create a ‘‘legal cover’’ for contraband:
Obviously it is practically impossible to develop a pure GT
[general trade] brand, thus a home base is necessary. It would
therefore seem logical to import legally some quantity, allowing
also for an advertising campaign to take place …75
Similarly, Paul Richardson asserted that legal imports would
serve as a cover for smuggling Kool cigarettes and for enabling
the brand’s local promotion:
Kool is considered to be the best B&W product offering for the
Nigerian market. ... Both legal and transit importing would be
required to properly—and profitably—develop the brand … Legal
imports would be loss making and significantly under invoiced
because of Nigeria’s high duty rates. Legal [sic] imports would
however establish a legitimate presence and enable B&W to
promote the brand.76
DISCUSSION
Internal BAT documents demonstrate that the use of cigarette
smuggling to gain market access to emerging markets extended
to the African continent. Documents suggest that the contra-
band trade had helped BAT gain leverage in negotiating with
governments, compete for market share, circumvent local
import restrictions and overcome local political and economic
instability and gain a market presence. Although senior
executives have denied company involvement,21 or attributed
illicit activity to rogue individuals,77 documents suggest contra-
band had been strategically central to furthering corporate
objectives.
Implications for tobacco control policy
Designing effective legislative and administrative initiatives
An understanding of the organisation and logistics of cigarette
smuggling in Africa provides essential insights for designing
effective legislative and administrative responses. Contraband
tobacco trade is exceedingly dynamic in terms of supply routes
and modes of transport. It is not a consequence of price
differentials. Contraband trade has been an integral element of
BAT’s market entry strategy, which is not driven by short term
financial gain, but rather efforts are undertaken to advance
longer-term corporate objectives. Therefore, policy responses
cannot focus solely on current mechanisms of smuggling,
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especially those reliant on controls at the border, because these
policy strategies are likely to be circumvented. Legislation must
be expansive, and the process for amendment sufficiently
flexible to ensure that smuggling means not yet exposed are
either captured or can be quickly added to the regulatory
response. Given that smuggling abetted by TTCs in country X
most often occurs between countries Y and Z, effective
legislative controls should include conspiracy to smuggle in
another country.
Similarly, measures that seek only to deter contraband by
removing the immediate economic gain will fail to address how
the industry uses smuggling tactically, often as a loss leader,
either to undermine competition or drive governments into
making policy decisions that best suit TTCs’ needs.
In addition to sufficiently large fines applied at the corporate
level, actively enforced criminal penalties that include incarcera-
tion for corporate officials is warranted. The potential for
lengthy prison sentence imposed on senior tobacco company
officials will probably create a far greater deterrent effect than
confiscation of product and profits on those instances where
contraband is intercepted. Perhaps most important of all,
sharing of information and reciprocal enforcement of judgments
will be essential. Transborder movement of information and
judgments is necessary to combat transborder smuggling of
cigarettes.
Regional and global considerations
The documents reviewed in this paper reiterate the importance
of addressing the contraband trade from a regional and global
perspective. The illicit supply of BAT cigarettes to Africa has
been carried out, via distributors and transiteers, with little
regard for national borders. Furthermore, the limited capacity of
customs and excise in many African countries has been unable
to prevent the establishment of regional supply routes across
the continent. These findings support the conclusion of the First
Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body on a
Protocol on Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, of the WHO
FCTC, for ‘‘incorporating strong provisions on international
cooperation’’.5
Effective deterrents, including criminal sanctions as advo-
cated here, will only happen if manufacturers remain legally
responsible for their products as they move through the supply
chain. This will require a systematically collected evidentiary
base at all stages. That evidence can be most readily derived
using a licensing system throughout the supply chain and the
sort of closely monitored tracking and tracing system suggested
by others.78
Of all WHO regions, Africa represents the region with the
greatest need for technical assistance to gather and analyse data,
develop and maintain tracking and tracing systems, and
investigate and prosecute alleged offenders. Africa would benefit
from the sharing of experiences of other regions, and the
establishment of a regional resource centre for ‘‘enriching the
skills sets of enforcement agencies’’.79
TTCs’ role in policy development
This paper affirms the need to exclude TTCs from involvement
in the development of policies to combat tobacco smuggling.
The industry has adopted a public position of promoting actions
to tackle contraband as part of ‘‘balanced regulation’’ framed
within claims of corporate social responsibility.80 BAT, in
particular, has depicted itself as working with governments
worldwide to combat illicit trade by, for example, signing
agreements with customs authorities in some 35 countries.81 In
November 2007, shortly before WHO-led negotiations com-
menced towards a protocol, BAT stated that it ‘‘look[s] forward
to partnering with governments in the development, negotia-
tion and implementation of an effective illicit trade protocol’’.82
In Africa, based on the emphasis placed by the Commission for
Africa on the role of customs reform in promoting regional
economic development,18 BAT along with Unilever has co-
sponsored the Business Action for Improving Customs
Administration in Africa (BAFICAA).83 BAFICAA aims ‘‘to help
governments realise that the private sector can be an active
partner in improving the customs environment’’,84 and that
‘‘the private sector must be the driver of change’’.85 BAT’s recent
position paper on the proposed FCTC protocol claims that the
group is ‘‘well placed to offer views on a package of practical
measures’’ to reduce tobacco smuggling.82
The findings of this paper suggest that BAT’s complicity in
contraband trade extended across the African continent, and
that its efforts to contribute to international cooperation to
address this problem should be understood in this context. In
reality, BAT’s proposals seek to advance corporate interests and
undermine an effective global response to tobacco smuggling.
For example, BAT has prioritised the problem of counterfeit
cigarettes, for which protection and redress already exists via
trade agreements.80 According to BAT chairman Jan du Plessis,
contraband serves to ‘‘deprive governments of tax revenues and
harm legitimate businesses and their suppliers, distributors and
retailers … [and] stimulate and fund criminal activity’’.86 Such
statements, however, must be evaluated within the context of
this paper’s analysis of BAT’s complicity in contraband activity
in Africa, which adds to existing documentation of such activity
elsewhere in the world.
CONCLUSION
Documents show that BAT has advanced its corporate interests
by systematically exploiting strategic opportunities to supply
the contraband tobacco trade throughout Africa. To date, BAT
and its senior directors have remained unaccountable via
litigation or public inquiry for these activities, which was
epitomised by the abandoned investigation by the UK
Department of Trade and Industry in 2004 amid reports of
political pressure.87 The lack of public accountability to date for
these activities, in some of the world’s poorest countries, starkly
undermines BAT’s claims of corporate social responsibility.
Above all, it calls into question efforts by the TTCs to be
recognised as legitimate participants in global tobacco control.
LIMITATIONS
Information from customs and law enforcement bodies indicate
that smuggling is a major and growing problem in Africa, based
on frequency and size of seizures, although there remains no
systematic collection of data.88 On the role of TTCs, one
commentator writes, ‘‘[b]ecause of the illegal nature of
smuggling, empirical research into firm participation has been
What this paper adds
This paper adds to the existing evidence of the transnational
tobacco companies’ (TTCs) knowledge of and complicity in
cigarette smuggling and is the first detailed and comprehensive
analysis of internal tobacco industry documents regarding the
TTCs’ smuggling activities in Africa.
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daunting if not impossible to undertake’’.89 While publicly
available tobacco industry documents remain limited by their
selective nature in terms of dates, countries and limited public
availability of documents withheld under the legal doctrine of
attorney-client privilege, they none the less offer critical insights
into the link between contraband and corporate strategy.
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